2026-09-09
governance
●●●○○
Good Possible by 2032
International Compute Governance
Rivals agree to verify and cap frontier training; an IAEA-for-compute emerges.
Probability this branch occurs by 2032
8–18%
8–18%
1 revision · 0/2 tripwires crossed
The scenario
After a scare, or before one if diplomacy works, major powers agree on reporting thresholds for large training runs, on-site or hardware-enabled verification, and shared evaluation of frontier models. It does not stop progress; it makes the fastest and most dangerous runs visible. The nuclear analogy is imperfect but the institutional shape is similar.
Preconditions
- A crisis or credible near-miss creates political will
- Verification technology (hardware attestation, compute monitoring) is workable
- Both principals prefer visibility to a blind race
Leading indicators
- Bilateral or multilateral AI talks with technical working groups
- Hardware-attestation standards in chips
- Compute reporting laws in any major jurisdiction
Tripwires
Observable thresholds. When one crosses, the scenario's status changes and the weekly re-run is brought forward.
clearcgr-t1
A treaty or binding agreement with verification provisions on frontier training is signed by the US and China
clearcgr-t2
A major jurisdiction mandates reporting of training runs above a compute threshold
Playbook
Prevent
- Not applicable; a branch to steer toward.
Detect
- Diplomatic and standards tracking.
Respond
individuals
- Support candidates and institutions that back verification
organizations
- Chip and cloud vendors: build attestation now; it becomes a market requirement
- Labs: publish compute usage voluntarily to make the norm real
governments
- Draft the treaty text before the crisis; the 1963 test-ban treaty was negotiable only because drafts existed
Recover
- If the regime fails, it usually fails on verification; invest in the technology so the next attempt sticks.
Steering signals · what moves probability toward this branch
- Hardware-enabled verification research
- Track-two dialogues
- Compute reporting laws as the domestic building block
Probability history
Every change is logged with its reason and the signals that drove it. Moves are bounded per week; a jump beyond the bound is flagged as a shock.
Probability range over time
Your estimate
Disagree with our range? Set yours. Estimates feed a community view that appears once enough people weigh in, and the weekly run reads the gap between our number and yours.
13%
2026-09-16
8–18%
seed
Seed estimate. Metaculus/FLI workshop gives 15% for compute-capacity restrictions; the pacing movement and insider alarm make a regime more thinkable than a year ago, but Anthropic skipping AISI shows even voluntary national verification is fragile.
Signals pushing on this branch
Built on
Every source reviewed for this scenario. The full ledger is public.
| Date | Source | Publisher | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | AI risk and policy forecasts from Metaculus and FLI's AI workshop More than 10 frontier actors by 2030: 68%. Compute-capacity restrictions: 15%. | LessWrong | forecast |
| 2026-09-12 | Amodei: we must pace the frontier Calls for slowed capability gains, external evaluator access, mandatory frontier testing, tighter chip controls. | Axios | news |
| 2026-09-09 | Anthropic reportedly withholds Mythos 5.1 from UK safety testing body | IT Pro | news |